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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
Nos. 15-3702, 15-3703, 15-3704, 15-3705 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
   
v. 
 
ROGER ATWOOD, I, Appellant in 15-3702, 15-3703 
ROGER ATWOOD, II, Appellant in 15-3704, 15-3705 
   
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Nos. 1-12-cr-00055-001, -002; 
D.C. Nos. 1-13-cr-00260-001, -002) 
District Judge: Hon. Christopher C. Conner 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 4, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, GREENBERG, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.  
(Filed: December 13, 2016) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellants Rodger Atwood I and Rodger Atwood II1 appeal their sentences for 
various drug convictions, arguing that the District Court committed error and the 
Government breached its plea agreements with them.  Because the sentences were 
properly calculated and there was no breach, we will affirm. 
I 
 The Atwoods, a father-son team, ran a large marijuana operation in Pennsylvania.  
In early February 2012, federal agents executed search warrants at their homes and found 
marijuana, drug paraphernalia, firearms, ammunition, and cash.     
 Atwood I was charged with state drug offenses and released on bail the same day.  
Days later, a federal grand jury in the Middle District of Pennsylvania returned an 
indictment (the “First Indictment”) charging the Atwoods with conspiracy to distribute 
marijuana, distribution of marijuana, and possession of a firearm in connection with drug 
trafficking.  Both Atwoods fled to Colorado.  They were arrested about three months later 
and returned to Pennsylvania to await trial.    
 Several months after they were arrested, law enforcement discovered that the 
Atwoods had been engaging in undisclosed “side deals,” attempting to purchase drugs to 
distribute for their own gain.  In one of these deals, the Atwoods ended up negotiating 
with a confidential informant.  This led to a second indictment in November 2013 for 
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine (the “Second 
Indictment”). 
                                              
1 We refer to the father as Atwood I and the son as Atwood II.  
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 In October 2013, the Atwoods pleaded guilty to a superseding information 
stemming from the marijuana charges in the First Indictment.  The plea agreements 
resolving the First Indictment contained language concerning sentencing reductions for 
acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and departures under U.S.S.G. 
§ 5K1.1.  In April 2015, the Atwoods pleaded guilty, pursuant to other plea agreements, 
to a superseding information related to the cocaine charges in the Second Indictment.   
 At their joint sentencing, the Atwoods challenged a number of recommendations 
contained in the Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”).  Relevant to this appeal, Atwood I 
challenged the enhancement for obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1, and both Atwoods 
asserted that they were entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility under 
§ 3E1.1.  In addition, both Atwoods complained about the § 5K1.1 departure the 
Government recommended.  
 The District Court overruled Atwood I’s objection to the obstruction enhancement, 
finding that the enhancement was warranted because he had fled immediately after his 
arrest on state charges and failed to appear for a judicial proceeding in the related state 
case, which delayed the federal prosecution.  
 The District Court also denied the Atwoods’ request for a reduction for acceptance 
of responsibility.2  It noted that the Atwoods continued to engage in extensive criminal 
activity after first being indicted, and that they denied significant aspects of the conduct 
                                              
2 While the Government agreed that the Atwoods had accepted responsibility with 
regard to the Second Indictment, it argued that the Atwoods’ flight and continued 
criminal conduct following the First Indictment demonstrated that they had not accepted 
responsibility for their actions related to that indictment.     
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that formed the basis for the conviction under the Second Indictment.  The District Court 
also observed that, because Atwood I had obstructed justice, he was not entitled to an 
exception from the rule that a defendant who obstructs justice is typically denied a 
§ 3E1.1 reduction.     
 The District Court did, however, grant the Government’s § 5K1.1 departure 
motion.  The District Court concluded that a three-level reduction, rather than the one-
level departure the Government recommended, balanced the Atwoods’ efforts against 
their continued criminal activity.   
 After noting that Atwood I was a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, the 
District Court sentenced Atwood I to 151 months’ imprisonment on each information, to 
be served concurrently, and sentenced Atwood II to 200 months’ imprisonment—100 
months on each information, to be served consecutively.  The Atwoods appeal. 
II3 
 The Atwoods argue that the District Court erred by failing to grant them 
reductions for acceptance of responsibility, and the Government breached the plea 
agreements by failing to advocate for the acceptance of responsibility reduction and not 
requesting a greater departure under § 5K1.1.  We will address each argument in turn. 
A 
 The Atwoods first argue that the District Court erred by failing to grant a sentence 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to § 3E1.1.4  Under § 3E1.1, a 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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defendant who adequately accepts responsibility for his criminal conduct is entitled to a 
reduction in his offense level.  See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.  “Because the sentencing judge ‘is 
in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility,’ we give great 
deference on review to a sentencing judge’s decision not to apply the . . . reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility to a particular defendant.”  United States v. Barr, 963 F.2d 
641, 657 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 5).   
 The District Court relied on several grounds for denying the reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility, and each is independently sufficient.  First, the District 
Court properly considered the Atwoods’ conduct prior to their guilty pleas in October 
2013.  We have not limited consideration of relevant conduct for purposes of assessing 
acceptance of responsibility to a certain time period or category of conduct.  Rather, any 
relevant conduct that occurs from the time the defendant is on notice of the Government’s 
interest in his criminal activities may be considered in determining whether he has truly 
manifested an acceptance of responsibility.  United States v. Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 128 
(3d Cir. 1996) (finding a denial of acceptance of responsibility proper where conduct 
took place pre-plea but after the defendant was indicted).  Here, the Government notified 
the Atwoods of its interest in their conduct at the time the search warrants were executed, 
and therefore their behavior thereafter may be considered. 
                                                                                                                                                  
4 A district court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines is subject to de novo 
review, but a factual determination as to whether a defendant is entitled to a reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility, for example, is reviewed for clear error.  United States v. 
Ceccarani, 98 F.3d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1996).  A defendant has the burden to demonstrate 
by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the reduction for acceptance of 
responsibility.  United States v. Harris, 751 F.3d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United 
States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 193 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
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 Such behavior includes Atwood I’s flight, and both Atwoods’ continued criminal 
conduct from the time they were first indicted in February 2012 until after their first 
guilty plea in October 2013.  The commentary to § 3E1.1 states that a court may take into 
account whether a defendant voluntarily withdraws from criminal conduct or 
associations.  See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1.  Given this rule, we cannot say the District 
Court committed clear error in concluding that the Atwoods’ entitlement to a reduction 
for acceptance of responsibility was “outweighed by” their failure to withdraw from 
“continued criminal activity.”  Ceccarani, 98 F.3d at 129-30 (citation omitted).   
 Nor did the District Court clearly err in denying the Atwoods the acceptance of 
responsibility reduction based on their denial of certain relevant conduct underlying their 
convictions.  Their failure to acknowledge such conduct is sufficient to deny them a 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility.  See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(A) (noting that 
among factors relevant to the acceptance of responsibility determination is “truthfully 
admitting the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitting or 
not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct for which the defendant is 
accountable”).  Thus, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of acceptance of 
responsibility.   
B 
 The Atwoods next assert that the Government breached provisions of the plea 
agreements arising out of the First Indictment.  The Atwoods contend that the 
Government breached terms regarding acceptance of responsibility and downward 
departures by failing to advocate for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility and 
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recommending only a one-level downward departure under § 5K1.1.5  These arguments 
lack merit. 
 In determining whether a plea agreement has been breached, we apply contract 
principles and look at whether the Government’s conduct was inconsistent with what was 
reasonably understood by the defendant when entering the guilty plea.6  United States v. 
Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 236 (3d Cir. 1998).  Thus, we must examine whether the 
claim of breach is one where “the defendant’s expectations as to his sentence are 
predicated on promises [made] by the Government or statements from the court,” or if it 
is based on “disappointed but unfounded expectations.”  United States v. Badaracco, 954 
F.2d 928, 939 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).   
1 
 We first address the Atwoods’ argument that the Government breached the 
agreements by only recommending a reduction for acceptance of responsibility on the 
Second Indictment, and declining to do so for the First Indictment.  They assert that the 
Government was aware of the conduct underlying the Second Indictment when it entered 
the first plea agreements, and despite its promise to support the reduction, it never 
intended to do so and thus acted in bad faith.     
                                              
5 “Whether the government’s conduct violates the terms of the plea agreement is a 
question of law” subject to plenary review.  United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 
1357, 1360 (3d Cir. 1989). 
6 We require the Government to generally “adhere strictly to the bargain it strikes 
with defendants” in entering a plea agreement.  United States v. Hodge, 412 F.3d 479, 
485 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1361.   
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 The agreements’ acceptance of responsibility provisions provide for the 
Government’s support for an acceptance of responsibility reduction if the Atwoods 
adequately demonstrate that they have, in fact, accepted responsibility.  The clause has a 
condition precedent, namely that the defendant show he has accepted responsibility.  If 
the condition is not satisfied, the agreements do not require the Government to support a 
reduction.  Here, the Atwoods did not fulfill the condition precedent as demonstrated by, 
among other things, their continual flouting of the law.  Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 236 
(contract principles, rather than a “rigidly literal” approach is required in interpreting plea 
agreements).  Because the Atwoods engaged in criminal conduct after entering their 
guilty pleas that is inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility, they failed to satisfy the 
condition needed to obtain support for a § 3E1.1 reduction.7  The Government therefore 
neither acted in bad faith in entering the agreements nor breached them by opposing the 
reduction. 
2 
 The Atwoods’ argument that the Government breached the plea agreements 
arising out of the First Indictment by only recommending a one-level departure under 
§ 5K1.1 also fails.  The Atwoods essentially argue that the Government’s decision to 
advocate only a one-level departure constitutes bad faith.   
                                              
7 As explained above, the District Court had an entirely separate and sufficient 
basis for declining to grant an acceptance of responsibility reduction outside of the 
Government’s alleged “bad faith” actions, namely the Atwoods’ criminal conduct prior to 
their plea, and the ongoing denial of significant relevant conduct.  Thus, even if the 
Government supported an acceptance reduction, its advocacy would not likely have 
changed the outcome. 
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The agreements here mandate that the Government will seek a departure if the 
Government believed the Atwoods provided substantial assistance and fully comply with 
their plea agreements.  Additionally, the Government explicitly retained the discretion 
concerning the amount of departure it would seek.  Thus, the agreements contained no 
language giving the Atwoods a basis to expect a specific departure recommendation from 
the Government.  See United States v. Medford, 194 F.3d 419, 423 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[W]e 
find no basis for the defendants’ contention that the government acted in bad faith by 
failing to make a more concerted 5K1.1 downward departure motion at the time of 
sentencing.” (internal citation omitted)); see also United States v. Erwin, 765 F.3d 219, 
227 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding no due process violation “[b]ecause the record is devoid of 
any indication that the Government promised it would specifically request a five-level 
downward departure”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 400 (2015).  The Government here 
complied with its obligations under the agreements by moving for a downward departure, 
and we cannot say that its one-level recommendation is outside the “range of 
expectations reasonably understood” by the Atwoods when they entered their plea.  
United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 186, 192 (3d Cir. 2010) (using contractual 
approach to analyze plea language and finding that the Government did not breach the 
plea by arguing certain enhancements to be applicable).  Therefore, the Government did 
not breach the agreements.  
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Furthermore, there is no basis to believe the Government acted in bad faith in 
making its one-level recommendation to the District Court.8  Section 5K1.1 requires that 
the District Court consider several relevant factors in exercising its discretion to depart 
downward, including the truthfulness and completeness of the information provided, and 
the nature and extent of assistance given.  U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1(a).  Thus, the District Court 
was permitted to temper its § 5K1.1 analysis with a recognition of the Atwoods’ 
extensive criminal behavior.  United States v. Torres, 251 F.3d 138, 148 (3d Cir. 2001).  
It therefore follows that the Government’s reliance on those same factors in fashioning its 
recommendation would not constitute bad faith. 
 Because the Government fully complied with its obligations pursuant to the plea 
agreements and did not act in bad faith, there is no basis to find a breach of the plea 
agreements or disturb the District Court’s sentences.   
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentences imposed by the District 
Court.9 
                                              
8 Because the Government abided by the terms of the plea agreements, a breach 
will generally be found only in cases of bad faith or an unconstitutional motive.  See 
United States v. Huang, 178 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 1999) (because the Government had 
discretion to decline to make a departure motion, its decision “is reviewable only for bad 
faith or an unconstitutional motive”).  Neither are present here. 
9 Atwood I also challenges the District Court’s application of a sentencing 
enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  However, we need 
not address this argument, because Atwood I is a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, 
and such an enhancement would have no impact on his sentence and any error associated 
with this issue would be harmless.   
